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Brahma Sutras with Shankara's commentary: the first four sutras

A Raja Ravi Varma print of Shankara seated on a tiger skin by a river, teaching four disciples in pale robes.

In the words of Pranav Ashar

How we render
Contents

Chapter 5: Sutra 1.1.4: but that, because it is their purport

But is scripture not about action?

But how can scripture be the means of knowing Brahman? It has been shown that scripture is about action: 'Since the Veda's purpose is action, passages without that purpose are pointless' (Jaimini 1.2.1). So the Upanishads, which are not about action, would be pointless. Or, if they mean anything, they either supplement commands to act, by telling about the doer, the god or the result, or they command some new act, such as meditation. The Veda cannot be about the nature of a thing that already exists, because such things fall under perception and the other means of knowing; and if it did describe one, the description would concern nothing to be sought or avoided and would serve no human purpose. That is why passages like 'he wept', which seem pointless, are shown to have a purpose as praise of an act (Jaimini 1.2.7, 'being one sentence with the command, they serve to praise it'); and mantras like 'for strength, you' are shown to belong to an act by naming the act or its means. Nowhere is a Vedic sentence seen or shown to have meaning except in touch with a command; and a command cannot be about the nature of an existing thing, since a command is about action. So the Upanishads supplement commands by telling about the doer, the god and the rest that action needs. Or, if that is refused because it brings in a subject foreign to them, they are about meditation and similar acts named in their own sentences. Either way, scripture is not the source of knowledge of Brahman. To this the author replies:

Note //

The view answered here is the Mimamsa school's, for which the Veda is essentially a set of commands. Shankara takes it seriously because it is the strongest objection to a teaching that only tells what is.

Verse 1.1.4

But that, because it is their purport

But that, because it is what they are all about.

Note //

Samanvaya, 'connection' or 'harmony': all the Upanishads, read rightly, have Brahman as their single purport. The site's own claim that the Upanishads teach the whole rests on this sutra.

Verse 1.1.4.a

All the Upanishads point to it

'But' sets the objection aside. That Brahman, all-knowing, all-powerful, cause of the world's birth, staying and dissolving, is known from the Upanishads alone. How? Because they all point to it. In all the Upanishads the sentences hang together in having this as their meaning: 'In the beginning, dear one, this was being alone, one without a second' (Chandogya 6.2.1); 'In the beginning this was the Self alone, one' (Aitareya 1.1.1); 'This is Brahman, with nothing before and nothing after, nothing inside and nothing outside; this Self is Brahman, knowing all' (Brihadaranyaka 2.5.19); 'This immortal Brahman is in front' (Mundaka 2.2.11), and so on. Once the words of these passages are settled as being about Brahman's nature, it is wrong to imagine another sense: that would give up what the text says for what it does not. Nor are they about the nature of a doer, since some passages rule out action, means and result altogether: 'Then by what, and whom, should one see?' (Brihadaranyaka 2.4.13). And though Brahman is something that already is, it is not an object of perception and the rest: that Brahman is one's own Self cannot be known without scripture, 'You are that' (Chandogya 6.8.7). Nor is teaching pointless because there is nothing to seek or avoid: simply from knowing oneself as Brahman, which is neither to be sought nor avoided, all trouble ends and the human aim is reached. That passages about gods and the like serve meditations in their own chapters, we grant. But Brahman cannot be a supplement to a command to meditate: once oneness is known there is nothing to seek or avoid, and the knowledge of two, of acts, agents and the rest, is crushed. Duality once uprooted by the knowledge of oneness does not rise again to make Brahman part of a command to meditate. Elsewhere Vedic sentences may be valid only in touch with a command; but the teaching about the Self has its result in itself, so its validity cannot be denied. Nor is scripture's validity a matter of inference, needing an example from elsewhere. So it is settled that scripture is the means of knowing Brahman.

Note //

The central argument of the catuhsutri: knowledge of the Self needs no command because its result is itself. 'Duality once uprooted does not rise again' is the site's position 7, read as ending the covering; the world goes on appearing, the confinement does not return.

Verse 1.1.4.b

A second objection: Brahman as the object of a command to meditate

Here others object. Granted that scripture is the means of knowing Brahman, it gives Brahman only as the object of a command to hold it in mind, just as it gives the sacrificial post, the ahavaniya fire and other things unknown in daily life, only as parts of commands. Why? Because scripture exists to set people to act or to stop them. Those who know its purpose say: 'Its seen purpose is to make action known'; 'a command is a sentence that moves one to act'; 'knowledge of duty comes from instruction' (Jaimini 1.1.5); 'words for existing things are to be joined to a sentence about action' (Jaimini 1.1.25); 'since the Veda is about action, what is not about it is pointless' (Jaimini 1.2.1). So scripture has meaning by moving a person to some things and holding him back from others, and the rest is useful as their supplement. The Upanishads, being scripture, mean in the same way; and if they are commands, then as the fire-offering is commanded for one who wants heaven, knowing Brahman is commanded for one who wants immortality. But it was said that what is inquired into differs: in the part on ritual, duty, which is still to be; here Brahman, which already is, ever complete. So the fruit of knowing Brahman should differ from the fruit of knowing duty, which depends on doing. It cannot differ, says the objector, because the Upanishads present Brahman only as tied to commands to act. There are commands: 'The Self is to be seen' (Brihadaranyaka 2.4.5); 'The Self free from evil is to be sought, to be wished to be known' (Chandogya 8.7.1); 'One should hold it in mind as the Self' (Brihadaranyaka 1.4.7); 'One should hold in mind the Self alone as one's world' (Brihadaranyaka 1.4.15); 'Whoever knows Brahman becomes Brahman' (Mundaka 3.2.9). These make one ask: what is this Self, what is Brahman? All the Upanishads serve to answer, by telling its nature: eternal, all-knowing, everywhere, ever content, ever pure, awake and free, knowing, full of joy. And from meditating on it comes freedom, a result known from scripture though not seen. If the Upanishads were not tied to commands but only described things, like 'the earth has seven continents' or 'there goes the king', they would be pointless, since nothing could be sought or avoided. You may say that describing a thing can have a point by itself: 'this is a rope, not a snake' removes the fear born of a mistake; so the Upanishads, describing the Self that is not caught in the round, would have a point in removing the mistake that one is caught in it. That would be so if, as hearing what the rope is removes the snake, merely hearing what Brahman is removed the mistake of being caught in the round. But it does not: those who have heard about Brahman are seen to feel pleasure and pain as before. And the Brihadaranyaka (2.4.5) commands reflecting and dwelling on it after hearing. So Brahman must be accepted as known from scripture only as the object of a command to hold it in mind.

Note //

The strongest objection in the section, and an honest one: people who have heard 'you are that' still suffer. Shankara's answer comes in the next units and at the end (1.1.4.h): the one who still suffers has not yet understood. The site holds the same (positions 7 and 9).

Verse 1.1.4.c

Freedom is not the result of any action

We reply: no, because the fruit of action and the fruit of knowing Brahman are different in kind. Action by body, speech and mind, known from scripture and tradition and called dharma, is what Jaimini's sutra 'Then, therefore, the inquiry into duty' inquires into; and its opposite, harming and the like, defined by prohibitions, is inquired into so as to avoid it. The fruits of these two, good and bad as the Veda defines them, are plainly pleasure and pain, felt only through body, speech and mind, born of the senses meeting their objects, and found in all beings from Brahma down to a blade of grass. Scripture tells of degrees of happiness among embodied beings from humans up to Brahma; from that we infer degrees of the merit that causes it, and degrees among those qualified to act, which depend on desire, capacity and the like. Scripture also says that those who sacrifice, by the excellence of their knowledge and meditation, go by the northern path, while those who only make offerings, do public works and give alms go by smoke and the rest along the southern path, and that there too there are degrees of happiness and its means: 'having stayed as long as their merit lasts' (Chandogya 5.10.5). In the same way, the small share of happiness among humans and below, down to beings in hell and plants, comes from merit as the Veda defines it, in degrees; and the degrees of pain among higher and lower beings point to degrees of demerit and of those who do it. So the round of birth and death, which comes from taking on bodies, rests on degrees of merit and demerit in those with faults such as , and brings degrees of pleasure and pain: impermanent, as scripture, tradition and reason all show. 'While embodied, one is not free from the pleasant and the unpleasant' describes it. But 'when bodiless, the pleasant and unpleasant do not touch one' (Chandogya 8.12.1) denies that the bodiless state called freedom is a product of dharma; if it were, being touched by pleasure and pain could not be denied. Is being bodiless itself the product of dharma? No: it is one's nature. 'The wise one who knows the Self as bodiless among bodies, unchanging among the changing, great and everywhere, does not grieve' (Katha 1.2.22); 'without breath, without mind, pure' (Mundaka 2.1.2); 'this person is unattached' (Brihadaranyaka 4.3.15). So freedom, bodilessness, is unlike the fruit of any action, and eternal. Some eternal things change: the idea 'this is the same thing' survives their changes, as with earth and the elements for those who hold the world eternal, or the three gunas for the Samkhyas. This is eternal in the highest sense: , everywhere like space, free of all change, ever content, without parts, shining by itself. Merit and demerit with their results, and the three times, do not touch it. That bodilessness is called freedom, as scripture says: 'other than right and wrong, other than what is done and not done, other than past and future' (Katha 1.2.14). So it is Brahman, the very thing this inquiry is about. If Brahman were taught as part of something to be done, and freedom were the result of that doing, freedom would be impermanent, just the best among the graded, impermanent fruits of action. But everyone who speaks of freedom holds that it is eternal; so Brahman is not taught as part of something to be done.

Note //

The decisive argument against the objection: whatever is produced ends; freedom does not end; so freedom is not produced. 'Changeless as an anvil' renders kutastha, the smith's anvil that stays while everything is hammered on it. The site holds this as position 1: the whole has no act and nothing to gain.

Verse 1.1.4.d

Knowing and freedom are one moment

Many passages show freedom coming right upon knowing Brahman, leaving no room for any further act between: 'Whoever knows Brahman becomes Brahman' (Mundaka 3.2.9); 'his works dwindle when he sees the higher and the lower' (Mundaka 2.2.8); 'knowing the joy of Brahman, one fears nothing' (Taittiriya 2.9); 'Janaka, you have reached fearlessness' (Brihadaranyaka 4.2.4); 'It knew itself: I am Brahman; so it became all this' (Brihadaranyaka 1.4.10); 'what delusion, what sorrow, for one who sees oneness?' (Isha 7). And this should be quoted too, to rule out any act between seeing Brahman and being the Self of all: 'seeing this, the seer Vamadeva knew: I was Manu, and the sun' (Brihadaranyaka 1.4.10), just as 'standing, he sings' tells us that the same person does nothing else between standing and singing. Other passages show that the only fruit of knowing the Self is the removal of what blocks freedom: 'You are our father, who carry us across our to the far shore' (Prashna 6.8); 'I have heard from such as you, sir, that one who knows the Self crosses over sorrow; I am in sorrow; take me, sir, across it' (Chandogya 7.1.3); 'to him, whose stains were wiped away, the revered Sanatkumara showed the far side of darkness' (Chandogya 7.26.2). The teacher's sutra, supported by reasoning, says the same: 'freedom comes from the removal of each in turn: pain, birth, activity, fault and false knowledge, each removed when the next is removed' (Nyaya Sutra 1.1.2). And false knowledge is removed by knowing that one's Self and Brahman are one.

Note //

'Standing, he sings' is Shankara's grammatical example: nothing intervenes. Knowing is not a step toward freedom; it is freedom, since what it removes was only a block. The site reads this as positions 6 and 7: the claim falls, and what remains was always so.

Verse 1.1.4.e

Not an imagined likeness, but the fact

Nor is this knowing of the Self as one with Brahman a likeness imagined for meditation, as in 'the mind is endless, the Vishvedevas are endless; by it one wins an endless world' (Brihadaranyaka 3.1.9). Nor is it a laying-on, as when 'hold in mind: the mind is Brahman' and 'the sun is Brahman, this is the teaching' (Chandogya 3.18.1, 3.19.1) lay the vision of Brahman on the mind or the sun. Nor is it a name given from a shared action, as in 'the wind is the swallower; breath is the swallower' (Chandogya 4.3.1). Nor is it a rite that prepares a part of an action, like looking at the sacrificial butter. If the knowing of the oneness of Brahman and the Self were any of these, the words of 'You are that' (Chandogya 6.8.7), 'I am Brahman' (Brihadaranyaka 1.4.10) and 'this Self is Brahman' (Brihadaranyaka 2.5.19), whose whole point is to tell the fact of that oneness, would be forced. So would the passages that give the end of as the fruit: 'the knot of the heart is cut, all doubts are resolved' (Mundaka 2.2.8). And passages about becoming Brahman, like 'whoever knows Brahman becomes Brahman' (Mundaka 3.2.9), could not be fairly explained. So the knowing of the oneness of Brahman and the Self is not of that kind. So knowing Brahman does not depend on human effort. Like the knowledge of what perception and the other means of knowing show, it depends on the thing alone. With a Brahman like this, and a knowledge like this, no reasoning can make room for any action.

Note //

Shankara sorts the Upanishads' sentences: some are meditations that imagine one thing as another; 'you are that' is not one of them, it is a statement of fact. The site's 'you-are-that' rests on this distinction.

Verse 1.1.4.f

Never an object, so never lost

Nor can Brahman be drawn into action as the object of knowing, since scripture says it is not: 'It is other than the known, and above the unknown' (Kena 1.3), and 'by what should one know that by which one knows all this?' (Brihadaranyaka 2.4.13). Scripture also denies that it is the object of meditation. Having said it is no object, 'what speech does not reveal, by which speech is revealed', it goes on: 'that alone know as Brahman, not this that people hold in mind' (Kena 1.4). If Brahman is no object, you say, scripture cannot be the means of knowing it. Not so: scripture aims to end the differences that has imagined. It does not try to show Brahman as an object, 'this'. It shows Brahman as , , and so removes the division into known, knower and knowing that invents. So scripture says: 'It is known to the one to whom it is unknown; the one who knows it does not know. Not understood by those who understand, understood by those who do not' (Kena 2.3); and 'you cannot see the seer of seeing, you cannot know the knower of knowing' (Brihadaranyaka 3.4.2). Since it removes the imagined round of birth and death and gives the nature of the ever-free Self, freedom is not open to the fault of being impermanent.

Note //

The site's position 8 in Shankara's words: the witness is never an object, so it cannot be found as one; scripture works by removing the division of knower and known, not by adding a new object. 'You cannot see the seer of seeing' is the line the site most often quotes.

Verse 1.1.4.g

Not produced, not reached, not polished

For those who think freedom is produced, it does need action of mind, speech or body; and so for those who think it is a change in something. On both views freedom must be impermanent: in ordinary life nothing changed, like curds, and nothing produced, like a pot, is seen to last. Nor does freedom need action because it is to be reached. Brahman is one's own Self, so it is not to be reached. And even if Brahman were other than one's Self, it would not need reaching: being everywhere, like space, it is by nature always already reached by everyone. Nor is freedom something to be refined, needing an act. Refining means adding a quality or removing a fault. Not adding a quality: freedom is Brahman, to which nothing can be added. Not removing a fault: freedom is Brahman, ever pure. But perhaps freedom is the Self's own quality, hidden, and shows when the Self is refined by an act, as brightness shows when a mirror is rubbed? No. The Self cannot be the seat of an act. An act does not happen without changing what it happens in; if the Self were changed by an act it would be impermanent, and sayings like 'this is called unchanging' would be contradicted, which no one wants. So no act can rest in the Self; and an act resting in something else cannot refine the Self, which is not its object. But we see the embodied one refined by acts resting in the body: bathing, sipping water, wearing the ritual thread. No: what is refined is only the Self joined to the body and taken hold of by . Bathing and the like plainly belong to the body; so what they refine is something joined to the body and taken by as oneself. When treatment of the body brings its elements into balance, the one who thinks 'I am well' is the one joined to the body and identified with it; in the same way, the one who thinks 'I am pure, I am refined' after bathing is the one joined to the body. It is this I-maker, the object of the notion 'I' and the subject of every notion, who performs all acts and enjoys their fruits: 'one of them eats the sweet fruit; the other looks on without eating' (Mundaka 3.1.1); 'joined with body, senses and mind, the wise call it the enjoyer' (Katha 1.3.4). Of Brahman two verses show that nothing can be added and that it is ever pure: 'One god hidden in all beings, everywhere, the inner Self of all, overseer of actions, dwelling in all beings, the witness, aware, alone, without qualities' (Shvetashvatara 6.11); and 'it has gone everywhere, bright, bodiless, unwounded, without sinews, pure, untouched by evil' (Isha 8). And freedom is being Brahman. So freedom is not to be refined either. No one can show any other way for action to enter into freedom. So, apart from knowing, not even a trace of action can enter here.

Note //

Four ways action might produce freedom (producing, changing, reaching, refining) and each is closed. 'One eats the fruit, the other looks on' is the image of the two birds that the site uses for the I-claim and the witness (positions 6 and 8).

Verse 1.1.4.h

Knowing is not doing

But knowing is an act of the mind. No, they are different in kind. An act is what is commanded without regard to the nature of the thing, and depends on what a person's mind does: 'to whatever god the offering is taken, on that one let him meditate as he is about to say vashat' (Aitareya Brahmana 3.8.1), and 'let him meditate on the twilight in his mind'. Meditating and thinking are mental, but a person can do them, not do them, or do them otherwise, because they depend on the person. Knowing is born of a means of knowing, and a means of knowing has as its object the thing as it is; so knowing cannot be done, not done, or done otherwise. It depends only on the thing, not on a command and not on the person. So though it is mental, it is very different. When the Chandogya says 'the man is fire, Gautama; the woman is fire, Gautama' (5.7.1, 5.8.1), the notion of fire in man and woman is mental and is an act, depending on the person, because it comes only from the command. But the notion of fire in fire as we know it depends neither on a command nor on a person; it depends on the thing in front of us, and so it is knowing, not an act. The same holds for everything the means of knowing show. So knowing Brahman as it is does not depend on a command. Command forms about it, though heard, fall flat, since there is no one to be commanded and nothing to seek or avoid, as a razor's edge is blunted on stone. What, then, are sentences that look like commands, such as 'the Self, dear one, is to be seen, to be heard'? They serve to turn a person away from the things toward which he naturally goes. A person turned outward, acting so that what he likes may come and what he dislikes may not, does not find the final good he longs for. These sentences turn him away from the natural round of body and senses and set the stream of his mind flowing toward the inner Self. To one who has turned to look for the Self, the Self is taught as nothing to seek or avoid: 'all this is this Self' (Brihadaranyaka 2.4.6); 'when everything has become one's own Self, by what and whom should one see, by what and whom should one know? By what should one know the knower?' (Brihadaranyaka 4.5.15); 'this Self is Brahman' (Brihadaranyaka 2.5.19). That knowing the Self, which is not about anything to be done, leads neither to seeking nor to avoiding, we grant gladly. It is our very ornament: when Brahman is known as the Self, all duties fall away and everything is done. So scripture: 'If a person knows the Self, I am this, wanting what, for whose sake, would he suffer along with the body?' (Brihadaranyaka 4.4.12). And tradition: 'knowing this, Bharata, one is wise and has done all there is to do' (Gita 15.20). So Brahman is not given as the object of a command to hold it in mind.

Note //

The site's position 6 and its practice line together: knowledge is not an act, so there is nothing to do to be what one is; and the 'commands' of the Upanishads are a turning of attention inward. 'It is our very ornament' (alankara) is one of Shankara's rare personal flourishes.

Verse 1.1.4.i

The person of the Upanishads

Some say that no part of the Veda simply tells what is, apart from commands to act or refrain and what supplements them. That is wrong, because the person taught in the Upanishads supplements nothing. That person, known from the Upanishads alone, not caught in the round, Brahman, unlike the four kinds of thing that can be produced, changed, reached or refined, standing in a subject of its own and supplementing nothing: of it one cannot say it does not exist or is not known. 'This Self is not this, not this' (Brihadaranyaka 3.9.26) calls it the Self, and the Self cannot be denied, since whoever denies it is that very Self. But the Self is the object of the notion 'I', so it is wrong to say it is known only from the Upanishads? No: it has been answered that the Upanishads' person is the witness of that. Neither the ritual part of the Veda nor any school of reasoning has found the person who is other than the doer that is the object of the notion 'I', and who is its witness: present in all beings, the same, one, , the Self of all. So no one can deny it or make it part of a command. And since it is everyone's Self, it is nothing to be sought or avoided. Everything that changes perishes, all the way up to the person; the person, having no cause to perish, does not perish, and having no cause to change, is , so it is by nature ever pure, awake and free. That is why 'beyond the person there is nothing; that is the end, the highest goal' (Katha 1.3.11) and 'I ask you about the person of the Upanishads' (Brihadaranyaka 3.9.26) fit, since the Upanishads above all reveal this person. So to say that no part of the Veda is about what already is, is sheer rashness.

Note //

The witness (sakshi) is distinguished from the 'I' that does and enjoys: the I-claim is the object of the notion 'I'; the witness is not. This is the site's positions 6 and 8 almost word for word, and 'whoever denies it is that very Self' is its answer to doubt about awareness.

Verse 1.1.4.j

Statements of what is, and the meaning of "not"

As for the sayings of those who know scripture's purpose ('its seen purpose is to make action known' and so on), they belong to the inquiry into duty and should be taken as about the part of scripture that commands and forbids. And whoever takes 'since the Veda is about action, what is not about it is pointless' quite strictly makes every statement about what exists pointless. If, apart from commands to act and refrain and their supplements, the Veda does tell of existing things as serving some act, why should it not tell of what exists and never changes? A thing that is told of does not become an act. Though existing things are not acts, telling of them serves action, since they are means to it, you say. No matter: even if the telling serves action, the thing told of is told as able to bring about the act; serving action is its purpose, but it is told of all the same. And if it is told of, what do you gain? This: telling of the Self, which is not known otherwise, is of the same kind; by knowing it, false knowledge, the cause of the round of birth and death, ends, and that purpose puts it on a level with telling of things that serve action. Moreover, the Veda teaches refraining too, as in 'a Brahmin is not to be killed'. Refraining is neither an act nor a means to one. If whatever does not express action were pointless, all such teachings of refraining would be pointless, which no one accepts. Nor can 'not', because it is joined to the naturally present act of killing, be made to mean some new act other than the stillness of not killing. The nature of 'not' is to make known the absence of what it is joined to, and the notion of absence is the cause of stillness; and that notion, like a fire that has burned its fuel, dies down only after it has done its work. So we hold that prohibitions such as 'a Brahmin is not to be killed' mean simply the stillness of refraining from an act that was possible, except in special cases like the Prajapati vows. So the charge of pointlessness applies only to stories and the like that tell of what exists but serve no human purpose.

Note //

A technical stretch against the Mimamsa: if only commands mean anything, prohibitions would mean nothing. The image of the fire that dies down after burning its fuel recurs in Advaita for the last thought that removes the others.

Verse 1.1.4.k

Bodiless while living

It was said that merely telling of a thing, apart from a command, is pointless, like 'the earth has seven continents'. That has been answered: 'this is a rope, not a snake' tells only of a thing, and its point is plain. But it was said that telling of Brahman does not have a point as telling of the rope does, because one who has heard of Brahman is still seen in the round of birth and death as before. We reply: it cannot be shown that one who has understood that Brahman is the Self remains in the round as before, because that contradicts his being Brahman, as known through the Veda. We see that one who takes the body and the rest as the Self feels pain and fear. We cannot suppose that the same person, once he has understood through the Veda that Brahman is the Self and has dropped that notion, still feels the pain and fear that came from the false knowledge. A rich householder suffers when it is stolen; once he has renounced and dropped that pride, the same theft does not hurt him. A man with earrings enjoys being their owner; once the earrings and the pride in them are gone, so is that pleasure. Scripture says: 'pleasant and unpleasant do not touch one who is bodiless' (Chandogya 8.12.1). Bodiless only when the body falls, you say, not while living? No, because being embodied comes from false knowledge. No cause for being embodied can be found other than the false knowledge that takes the body as the Self. And we have said that bodilessness is eternal, since it is not caused by action. Is embodiedness caused by merit and demerit that the Self has made? No: the Self's connection with a body is not established, so neither is its having made merit and demerit. To make embodiedness depend on merit and demerit, and merit and demerit on embodiedness, is arguing in a circle; and making the chain beginningless is a line of the blind leading the blind. Besides, the Self cannot be a doer, since it cannot be joined with action. Kings and the like are doers by mere presence, you say? No: they have servants bought with wages and gifts; nothing like wages can be imagined that would make the Self owner of the body and the rest. The plain cause of the connection is the false notion. That also explains how the Self is called the sacrificer. Some say the Self, which is other than the body, takes the body as its own in a figurative sense, not falsely. No. A figurative use requires that the difference of the two things be known. Where one knows the animal with a mane, the true referent of the word and notion 'lion', and knows also a man with a lion's fierceness and courage, the word 'lion' is used of the man figuratively. Where the difference is not known, using one thing's word and notion for another is simply error: as when, in dim light, one does not see that it is a post and calls it a man; or when, all at once, one is sure that the shell is silver. How can 'I' said of the body, which arises from not telling Self and not-Self apart, be called figurative? Even learned people who know the difference use these words and notions as undiscerningly as shepherds and goatherds. So for those who hold that the Self is other than the body, 'I' said of the body is simply false, not figurative. Since embodiedness comes from a false notion, it is established that the one who knows is bodiless even while living. Scripture says of the knower of Brahman: 'As the slough of a snake lies dead and cast off on an anthill, so this body lies; and this bodiless, immortal life is Brahman, is light' (Brihadaranyaka 4.4.7); and 'with eyes as if without eyes, with ears as if without ears, with speech as if without speech, with mind as if without mind, with breath as if without breath'. Tradition too, in describing the one of steady wisdom ('what is the mark of one of steady wisdom?', Gita 2.54), shows that the knower is untouched by any activity. So one who has understood Brahman as the Self is not in the round as before. And one who is still in the round as before has not understood Brahman as the Self. There is no contradiction.

Note //

The answer to the objection of 1.1.4.b, and the origin of the teaching of jivanmukti, freedom while living: embodiedness is a notion, so its end does not wait for death. 'One who is still in the round as before has not understood' is the test the site sets in its practice line: whether it holds under pressure (positions 7 and 9).

Verse 1.1.4.l

Reflection serves knowing; the end of the means

It was also said that because reflecting and dwelling come after hearing, Brahman is part of a command, not complete in itself. No: reflecting and dwelling serve understanding. If Brahman, once understood, were put to some other use, it would be part of a command; but that is not so, since reflecting and dwelling, like hearing, serve understanding. So Brahman cannot be known from scripture as the object of a command to hold it in mind; it is settled that Brahman stands by itself, known from scripture, because all the Upanishad passages point to it. That is why a separate teaching, beginning 'then, therefore, the wish to know Brahman', makes sense. If it were about a command to hold something in mind, no separate teaching would be begun, since 'then, therefore, the inquiry into duty' had already begun one; or it would begin 'then, therefore, the inquiry into the remaining duties', as Jaimini begins 'then, therefore, the inquiry into what serves the rite and what serves the person' (4.1.1). But the oneness of Brahman and the Self had not been taught, so a teaching for it rightly begins: 'then, therefore, the wish to know Brahman'. So all commands and all the other means of knowing end in 'I am Brahman'. When the Self that is not two, nothing to drop and nothing to take, has been understood, the means of knowing have no object and no knower, and cannot remain means of knowing. And they have said: 'When the figurative self and the false self are gone, because son, body and the rest are seen through, and one knows: I am being, Brahman, the Self, how could anything remain to be done? Before the Self that is to be searched for is known, the Self is the knower; once searched for, that same knower is free of evil, fault and the rest. As the notion that the body is the Self is taken as valid, so ordinary means of knowing are valid until the Self is known.' Here ends the section of the four sutras.

Note //

The closing verses are quoted from an earlier teacher (traditionally Sundara Pandya); they are the site's position 7 in miniature: the knower that searched turns out to be what was searched for, and the ordinary means of knowing keep their validity until then, and their use after. The 'four sutras' (chatuhsutri) are the foundation of all Advaita commentary.

Touch an underlined word to see the Sanskrit behind it. The lighter lines are how the tradition read the verse; the rest is the verse.

The renderings on this page are shared under CC BY-NC 4.0, in the words of Pranav Ashar.