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Spinoza: the Ethics, Parts 1 and 5

The opening pages of Spinoza's Ethics in Latin from the 1677 edition, with definitions, axioms and the first propositions.

In the words of Pranav Ashar

How we render

The heart of the Spinoza: the Ethics, Parts 1 and 5

In brief

Baruch, or Benedict, de Spinoza (1632 to 1677) ground lenses in Holland and wrote the Ethics in the form of geometry: definitions, axioms, propositions, proofs. It was printed after his death, in 1677. Twelve units from Part 1, on God, and Part 5, on freedom, are given here in plain words in his own sense, with Elwes's translation of 1883 beside each.

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Contents

Verse 1.def

The definitions

1. By cause of itself I mean that whose essence involves existence: that whose nature cannot be conceived except as existing. 2. A thing is called finite in its kind when it can be limited by another of the same nature. A body, for example, is called finite because we always conceive another, larger one. So a thought is limited by another thought. But a body is not limited by a thought, nor a thought by a body. 3. By substance I mean what is in itself and is conceived through itself: that whose concept does not need the concept of another thing to be formed from. 4. By attribute I mean what the intellect perceives of substance as making up its essence. 5. By mode I mean the states of substance: what is in another, and is conceived through that other. 6. By I mean a being absolutely infinite: a substance made up of infinite attributes, each of which expresses an eternal and infinite essence. Explanation: I say absolutely infinite, not infinite in its kind. Of what is infinite only in its kind, we can deny infinite attributes; but to the essence of what is absolutely infinite belongs whatever expresses essence and involves no negation. 7. That thing is called free which exists from the necessity of its own nature alone and is determined to act by itself alone. That thing is called necessary, or rather compelled, which is determined by another to exist and to act in a fixed and settled way. 8. By eternity I mean existence itself, insofar as it is conceived to follow necessarily from the definition alone of an eternal thing. Explanation: such existence is conceived as an eternal truth, like the essence of a thing, and so cannot be explained by duration or time, even if duration is conceived to have no beginning and no end.

Note //

Everything in Part 1 is built from these eight lines; 3, 5 and 6 carry the weight. In Spinoza's sense 'God' names the one infinite substance, not a person who plans. The site reads definition 3 as its 'the whole' (what is in itself) and definition 5 as dependent reality: a mode is real, but only in another (positions 1 and 2).

Verse 1.14

Besides God no substance

Besides no substance can be, or be conceived. Proof: is a being absolutely infinite, of whom no attribute that expresses the essence of substance can be denied (definition 6), and he exists necessarily (proposition 11). If there were any substance besides , it would have to be explained through some attribute of , and so two substances with the same attribute would exist, which is absurd (proposition 5). So no substance outside can be, and so none can be conceived either. For if it could be conceived, it would have to be conceived as existing, and that, by the first part of this proof, is absurd. So outside no substance can be, or be conceived. Which was to be shown. Corollary 1: It follows most clearly, first, that is unique: in the nature of things there is only one substance, and it is absolutely infinite, as we hinted in the note to proposition 10. Corollary 2: It follows, second, that the extended thing and the thinking thing are either attributes of or states of the attributes of .

Note //

Spinoza's monism in one line: there are not many substances, there is one. The site reads 'besides God no substance' beside the Upanishadic 'one without a second', with the difference that Spinoza's one substance is known through infinitely many attributes, thought and extension among them, where the site's whole is awareness and being (position 1).

Verse 1.15

Whatever is, is in God

Whatever is, is in , and nothing can be, or , without . Proof: besides no is, or can (proposition 14), that is, nothing that is in itself and is conceived through itself (definition 3). But cannot be, or , without (definition 5); so they can be only in 's nature, and can only through it. But besides s and there is nothing (axiom 1). So nothing can be, or , without . Which was to be shown.

Note //

The long note that follows in the Ethics, on whether God can be extended, is left out here. Spinoza's 'in' is the 'in' of definition 5: a mode is in substance as a wave's shape is in the water, not as a coin is in a box. The site reads this as its pot and clay: real as a pot, never apart from the clay (position 2).

Verse 1.18

The cause that stays within

is the cause of all things that stays within them, not one that passes over to them. Proof: all things that are, are in and must be conceived through (proposition 15); so is the cause of the things that are in him (proposition 16, corollary 1). That is the first point. Next, outside there can be no substance (proposition 14), that is, no thing that is in itself outside . That was the second. So is the cause of all things that stays within them, not one that passes over to them. Which was to be shown.

Note //

'Immanent, not transient' is the scholastic pair: a transient cause acts on something outside itself, an immanent one stays in what it produces. Spinoza's God makes nothing outside itself. The site reads this as the order (Ishvara) as the whole's own intelligence in everything, with no maker standing apart (position 3).

Verse 1.29

Nothing is contingent

In nature there is nothing contingent: all things have been determined from the necessity of 's nature to exist and to act in a certain way. Proof: whatever is, is in (proposition 15). But cannot be called a contingent thing, for he exists necessarily, not contingently (proposition 11). Next, the modes of 's nature have also followed from it necessarily, not contingently (proposition 16), whether 's nature is considered absolutely (proposition 21) or as determined to act in a certain way (proposition 27). Further, is the cause of these modes not only insofar as they simply exist (proposition 24, corollary), but also insofar as they are considered as determined to do something (proposition 26). If they have not been determined by , it is impossible, not contingent, that they should determine themselves; and if they have been determined by , it is impossible, not contingent, that they should make themselves undetermined (proposition 27). So all things have been determined from the necessity of 's nature, not only to exist, but to exist and act in a certain way, and there is nothing contingent. Which was to be shown. Note: Before I go further I want to explain here, or rather point out, what we must understand by nature naturing and what by nature natured. From what has gone before I think it is already clear that by nature naturing we must understand what is in itself and is conceived through itself, or the attributes of substance that express eternal and infinite essence, that is, insofar as he is considered as a free cause. By nature natured I understand everything that follows from the necessity of 's nature, or of each of 's attributes: all the modes of 's attributes, insofar as they are considered as things that are in and can neither be nor be conceived without .

Note //

'Nature naturing' (natura naturans) and 'nature natured' (natura naturata) are one nature seen as producing and as produced; Spinoza borrowed the pair from the scholastics and changed its sense. The site reads them as the whole and its appearance, never two (positions 1 and 2), and reads 'nothing contingent' as the order, with the difference that Spinoza allows no not-knowing at the root, only inadequate ideas in finite minds.

Verse 5.3

A passion stops being a passion

A that is a passion stops being a passion as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea of it. Proof: a that is a passion is a confused idea (general definition of the feelings). So if we form a clear and distinct idea of the itself, this idea will differ from the , insofar as the is referred to the mind alone, only in the way we think of it (Part 2, proposition 21 with its note); and so the will stop being a passion (Part 3, proposition 3). Which was to be shown. Corollary: So the better we know a , the more it is in our power, and the less the mind is acted on by it.

Note //

A 'passion' for Spinoza is any feeling in which the mind is acted on, its cause lying partly outside it; understanding the feeling makes the mind active. The site reads this beside position 9: the pain may stay, the suffering, which is being driven, ends when the thing is seen clearly.

Verse 5.15

Whoever understands himself loves God

Whoever understands himself and his feelings clearly and distinctly loves , and the more so, the more he understands himself and his feelings. Proof: whoever understands himself and his feelings clearly and distinctly is glad (Part 3, proposition 53), and his gladness comes with the idea of (the previous proposition); so he loves (definition 6 of the feelings), and, for the same reason, the more so, the more he understands himself and his feelings. Which was to be shown.

Note //

In Spinoza's definitions love is gladness accompanied by the idea of its cause; since every clear idea of oneself involves the idea of God, understanding oneself becomes loving God. The site reads this as inquiry and devotion meeting: to know what one is, is already to turn toward the whole.

Verse 5.23

We feel and know that we are eternal

The human mind cannot be destroyed altogether with the body: something of it remains that is eternal. Proof: in there is necessarily a concept or idea that expresses the essence of the human body (the previous proposition), and it is therefore necessarily something that belongs to the essence of the human mind (Part 2, proposition 13). But we give the human mind no duration that can be marked by time, except insofar as it expresses the actual existence of the body, which is explained by duration and can be marked by time; that is, we give it duration only while the body lasts (Part 2, proposition 8, corollary). Yet since there is something, all the same, that is conceived with a certain eternal necessity through 's very essence (the previous proposition), this something, which belongs to the essence of the mind, will necessarily be eternal. Which was to be shown. Note: This idea, which expresses the essence of the body under a form of eternity, is, as we have said, a certain way of thinking, which belongs to the essence of the mind and is necessarily eternal. Still, it cannot happen that we remember existing before the body, since there can be no trace of it in the body, and eternity cannot be marked by time or have any relation to time. But all the same that we are eternal. For the mind feels the things it conceives by understanding no less than the things it has in memory. The eyes of the mind, by which it sees and observes things, are the proofs themselves. So although we do not remember existing before the body, we feel that our mind, insofar as it involves the essence of the body under a form of eternity, is eternal, and that this existence of it cannot be marked by time or explained by duration. Our mind, then, can be said to last, and its existence can be marked by a set time, only insofar as it involves the actual existence of the body; and only so far does it have the power to fix the existence of things by time and to conceive them under duration.

Note //

'We feel and know by experience that we are eternal' (sentimus experimurque nos aeternos esse) is the most quoted sentence in Part 5. Spinoza's eternity is not endless time but existence outside time, and what is eternal is not the remembered person. The site reads this as position 3's changeless beside the stream, and agrees that no memory carries it.

Verse 5.24

The more we understand particular things

The more we understand particular things, the more we understand . Proof: this is clear from Part 1, proposition 25, corollary.

Note //

The corollary cited says particular things are nothing but states of God's attributes, ways in which they are expressed in a certain and settled manner. So knowing a leaf or a feeling well is knowing God, not turning away from him. The site agrees: the whole is not found by leaving things but by seeing what they are (position 2).

Verse 5.25

The third kind of knowledge

The highest striving of the mind, and its highest virtue, is to understand things by the third kind of knowledge. Proof: the third kind of knowledge goes from an adequate idea of certain attributes of to adequate knowledge of the essence of things (see its definition in Part 2, proposition 40, note 2); and the more we understand things in this way, the more we understand (the previous proposition). So the highest virtue of the mind (Part 4, proposition 28), that is, the mind's power or nature (Part 4, definition 8), or its highest striving (Part 3, proposition 7), is to understand things by the third kind of knowledge. Which was to be shown.

Note //

Spinoza's three kinds are imagination (from the senses and hearsay), reason (from common notions) and intuitive knowledge (scientia intuitiva), which sees a particular thing at once in God. The site reads the third kind beside knowledge arising in understanding (position 6), with the caution that Spinoza's intuition is still an idea, where the site's knowing ends in recognising the knower.

Verse 5.36

The mind’s love is God’s love of himself

The mind's intellectual love of is the very love by which loves himself, not insofar as he is infinite, but insofar as he can be expressed through the essence of the human mind, considered ; that is, the mind's intellectual love of is part of the infinite love by which loves himself. Proof: this love of the mind must be counted among the mind's actions (proposition 32 of this part, corollary, and Part 3, proposition 3); so it is an action by which the mind looks at itself, with the idea of as cause (proposition 32 of this part and its corollary); that is, an action by which , insofar as he can be expressed through the human mind, looks at himself, with the idea of himself (Part 1, proposition 25, corollary, and Part 2, proposition 11, corollary); and so this love of the mind is part of the infinite love by which loves himself (the previous proposition). Which was to be shown. Corollary: It follows that , insofar as he loves himself, loves human beings, and so the love of for human beings and the mind's intellectual love of are one and the same. Note: From this we see clearly in what our salvation, or blessedness, or freedom, consists: in a constant and eternal love of , or in 's love for human beings. This love, or blessedness, is called glory in scripture, and rightly. For whether this love is referred to or to the mind, it can rightly be called peace of mind, which is not really different from glory (definitions 25 and 30 of the feelings). For insofar as it is referred to , it is gladness, if we may still use the word, with the idea of himself (proposition 35 of this part); and so too insofar as it is referred to the mind (proposition 27 of this part). Next, since the essence of our mind consists in knowledge alone, whose source and foundation is (Part 1, proposition 15, and Part 2, proposition 47, note), it becomes plain to us how and in what way our mind, in its essence and its existence, follows from 's nature and depends on without a break. I thought this worth noting here to show by this example how strong the knowledge of particular things is, which I have called intuitive, or of the third kind (Part 2, proposition 40, note 2), and how much more it can do than the universal knowledge I called the second kind. For although in Part 1 I showed in general that all things, and so the human mind too, depend on in essence and existence, that proof, though valid and beyond the risk of doubt, does not move our mind as much as when the same thing is concluded from the very essence of some particular thing that we say depends on .

Note //

The pivot of Part 5: the love that seems to go from the mind to God is God's own love of himself, so there are not two lovers. In Spinoza's sense this love is intellectual, an act of understanding, not a feeling one works up. The site reads it as position 6's recognition said as love: the claim of a separate lover falls, and what remains is the whole knowing itself through this mind.

Verse 5.42

Blessedness is not the reward of virtue

is not the reward of virtue, but virtue itself. We do not enjoy it because we hold back our cravings; we can hold back our cravings because we enjoy it. Proof: blessedness consists in love of (proposition 36 of this part and its note), and this love arises from the third kind of knowledge (proposition 32 of this part, corollary); so this love must be referred to the mind insofar as it acts (Part 3, propositions 59 and 3), and therefore it is virtue itself (Part 4, definition 8). That was the first point. Next, the more the mind enjoys this love of , or blessedness, the more it understands (proposition 32 of this part), that is, the greater power it has over its feelings (proposition 3 of this part, corollary), and the less it is acted on by feelings that are bad (proposition 38 of this part); and so, from the mind's enjoying this love of , or blessedness, it has the power to hold back its cravings. And since human power to hold back the feelings lies in the understanding alone, no one enjoys blessedness because he has held back his feelings; on the contrary, the power to hold back cravings arises from blessedness itself. Which was to be shown. Note: With this I have finished all I wanted to show about the mind's power over the feelings and about the mind's freedom. It is clear from this how much the wise person can do, and how much stronger he is than the ignorant one, who is driven by alone. For the ignorant person, besides being shaken in many ways by outside causes and never having true peace of mind, lives as if he knew neither himself nor nor things, and as soon as he stops being acted on, he also stops being. The wise person, on the other hand, insofar as he is considered as such, is hardly moved in spirit; aware of himself and of and of things by a certain eternal necessity, he never stops being, and always has true peace of mind. If the way I have shown to lead here now seems very hard, it can still be found. And it must be hard, since it is found so seldom. For how could it be, if salvation were close at hand and could be found without great labour, that nearly everyone neglects it? But all things excellent are as difficult as they are rare.

Note //

The last proposition and the last sentence of the Ethics. In Spinoza's sense freedom is the mind's acting from its own nature, which is understanding; blessedness is that activity, not a prize after it. The site reads this as free while living (position 7): nothing is earned later, and the test is whether it holds when the cravings come.

Touch an underlined word to see the Latin behind it. The lighter lines are how the tradition read the verse; the rest is the verse.

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